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Abstract
An important issue in modern cache designs is bridging
the gap between wire and device delays. This warrants the
use of more regular and modular structures to mask wire la-
tencies. This paper advances the basic concepts of shadow
caching to offer protection against both data corruption
and micro-network disruption in partitioned architectures.
Network disruption is tolerated by sending shadow packet
along a different route than the original packet, whereas the
data corruption problem is addressed by reserving a small
portion of the overall cache capacity for in-cache shadow
space. Our results show that an average of 96% in data er-
ror coverage for Spec2K benchmarks can be achieved and
more than 99% of the transient faults on the underlying
switched micro-network can also be protected while incur-
ring less than 3% performance degradation in most of the
above benchmarks.
1. Introduction
While denser and deeper submicron technology con-
tributes to the increase in transient faults in cache memo-
ries, on-chip L2 caches are expected to grow in size. The
large caches also have very large latencies due to increased
global wire delays across the chip. Bulk of the access time
involves routing to and from the banks, not the bank ac-
cesses themselves [3]. The access time of conventional
lower-level caches has been the longest access time of all
sub-arrays, but such uniform access fails to exploit the dif-
ferences in latencies among sub-arrays. Hence there is
a need for more regular and modular cache architectures
where the cache is partitioned into banks (connected by a
switched micro-network instead of busses) that can be ac-
cessed at different latencies. For example, Dynamic Non-
Uniform Cache Architecture (D-NUCA) was proposed as a
solution to this problem in Kim, Berger, and Keckler [3].
They reported that D-NUCA achieved 1.5 times the IPC
of a Uniform Cache Architecture (UCA). While D-NUCA
provides performance enhancement in large on-chip caches,
issues regarding providing information and communication
integrity in partitioned cache architectures remain largely
unaddressed.
This paper seeks to improve the transient error behav-
ior of DSM cache architectures that deploy partitioned ar-
chitectures by exploiting fault tolerance in the underlying
micro-network, and overcoming the deficiency of direct ap-
plication of shadow caching. We propose a fault-tolerant
substrate, called Partitioned Cache Shadowing (PCS) and
another version of it with micro-network fault tolerance
called Shadow-Packet Partitioned Cache Shadowing (SP-
PCS), for wire-delay dominated on-chip caches. The basic
idea is to accomplish high fault coverage even in the pres-
ence of multiple-bit faults without any hardware replication
and to avoid the use of a timer-based counter by reusing
the distance-based non-uniformity concept exploited in D-
NUCA, wherein the ”hottest” blocks are migrated to the
nearest cache banks depending on their usage, and thus
making such banks the real candidates for protection. This
mechanism can also be bundled with the embedded Error
Correction Code (ECC). Our simulation experiments show
an average of 96% in cache fault coverage can be achieved
for Spec2K benchmarks and more than 99% of the transient
faults that can happen to a random hop within the under-
lying switched micro-network can also be protected while
incurring less than 3% performance degradation in most of
the above benchmarks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 explores Partitioned Cache Shadowing (PCS). In sec-
tion 3, we present a scheme called Shadow-Packet Parti-
tioned Cache Shadowing (SP-PCS), which guards against
both data corruption and network disruption in the switched
micro-network. Section 4 describes our experimental setup.
The simulation results are presented in Section 5. The last
section summarizes the contributions of this paper.
2 Partitioned Cache Shadowing (PCS)
2.1 Our Contributions
Our goal is to provide high protection coverage for spa-
tial or terrestrial applications that require very high data in-
tegrity or operate under highly noisy environments where
parity- and ECC-based protection schemes are not satisfac-
tory. It is easier to include shadow caching in partitioned
architectures due to its specific features such as distance-
based access latency and dynamic swapping on cache hits
that provide a convenient way to replace timer-based dead-
block estimator with a distance-based dead-block predic-
tor in partitioned cache architectures. The accuracy of the
timer-based predictor can be further enhanced by exploit-
ing the fact that the MFU lines in partitioned structures are
location-wise fixed (i.e. in the way-sets that are closest to
the cache controller and in the MFU cache line of each set
in the rest of the cache banks). Moreover, previous work
on Network-On-Chip(NOC) fault tolerance focused mainly
on communication reliability. We propose a novel fault-
tolerant substrate superimposed on the partitioned cache ar-
chitecture by combining it with shadow caching and also
include protection against both data corruption and micro-
network disruption. We tolerate the micro-network dis-
ruption by replicating information packets and sending a
shadow packet along a different route than the original
packet. The data corruption problem is addressed by reserv-
ing a small portion of the overall cache capacity for in-cache
shadow space.
2.2 Partitioned Cache Shadowing
Similar to [3], this paper organizes the L2 cache in a two
dimensional n x n mesh of cache banks as shown in Fig. 1
for an example of n=8. Each of the n*n banks is a k-way
set associative cache where k=4 as shown in Fig. 2. Each
column of banks represents a way-set. Each way-set has
similar access time. Way-set0 is thus the fastest and way-
set7 is the slowest to access. A new cache line is brought
into way-set0 and propagates towards way-set7 with time
as swaps happen. The baseline configuration implements
various schemes for mapping cache banks in way-sets, data
searching, promotion of cache lines, and replacement. We
in this paper deploy the following mechanisms:
• Simple mapping. With simple mapping, each column
of banks in the L2 cache becomes a bank-set. All
banks within that bank-set have different access time
due to their distances from the cache controller. Each
row of banks in L2 cache becomes a way-set. All
banks within each way-set have similar access time.
Figure 1. PCS within a Bank-set in partitioned
cache architectures. Each square represents
a cache bank. The highlighted column shad-
ows the rest of the cache space.
• Multicast Search with Smart Search. The cache is
searched for a line by first selecting a bank-set, then
selecting the set within the bank-set and finally per-
forming a tag match on banks within that bank-set.
The requested address is multicast to some or all of
the banks in the requested bank-set. Tag lookups pro-
ceed simultaneously, but at different real times due to
wiring delays in the switched micro-network. Smart
search, i.e. partial tag comparison, maintains a cache
of partial tags for speedy tag lookups.
• One-bank Promotion, Dynamic Swapping on Cache
Hits. When a hit occurs to a cache line, it is swapped
with the line in the bank that is next closest to the cache
controller. Most-frequently-used used cache lines are
thus promoted towards closer and faster banks.
• Zero Copy Insertion, Head Replacement. On cache
misses, a replacement is found in the nearest bank for
a bank-set. The victim cache line is evicted from the
entire L2 cache.
On the coarse-grained bank-set level (see Fig. 1), we
propose to use way-set1 to provide a complete shadow of
way-set0. On the finer-grained cache-bank level(see Fig.
2), we propose to use a fixed cache line in each set to
shadow the MFU lines in each cache bank. Recall that each
bank is a multi-way set associative cache. It was reported
in [3] that most of L2 cache hits are concentrated on way-
set0 of partitioned cache architecture. Based on this obser-
vation, we propose to reserve way-set1 as the shadow for
way-set0 (Fig. 1). The use of way-set1 as the shadow is
mainly based on performance concerns since way-set1 is
nearer to the cache controller and shadow space accesses
Figure 2. Shadowing within a Cache Bank.
The highlighted tag/data array shadows the
rest of the cache bank tag/data arrays respec-
tively.
can be quite frequent. Other way-sets can also be selected
for shadowing. With dynamic swapping, most-frequently-
used cache lines will tend to gravitate towards way-set0.
Whenever there is a cache access in way-set0, the corre-
sponding shadow cache line in way-set1 is used for verifica-
tion. While the main cache serves the pipeline’s request, the
shadow way-set synchronously monitors the integrity of the
main cache and updates the shadow cache lines. Since all of
the shadow cache operations take place in parallel with pri-
mary data cache, performance degradation resulting from
using such a scheme is minimal. Notice that we do not re-
quire any counter to be associated with a cache line as is the
case in [4].
To enhance the protection further, we propose a finer-
grained scheme along with the above shadow caching at
the bank-set level to guard against data corruption in each
cache bank. So and Rechtchaffen [5] showed that more than
90% of cache hits were to the most recently used ways in a
four-way set associative cache. For banks not protected by
the first scheme in bank sets 2 to n-1 (7 in our example), we
reserve one cache line per set (including both tag and data)
in a set-associative cache bank as the shadow cache line as
shown in Fig. 2. Barring positive verification by either ECC
or Comparison unit, that primary line is considered unpro-
tected.
• Scenario 1 (a p-space read hit and a s-space read hit):
Once we have a read-hit in the s-space, we know that
it will also be a read-hit in p-space. Both of the data
copies are retrieved from respective cache lines and
the cache controller verifies their contents (using ECC
if available or by comparison). Verified data are pre-
sented to the processor. If there is a mismatch, the
cache controller retries the operation. If the error per-
sists, the cache controller invalidates cache lines if they
are clean, or declares a computation error.
• Scenario 2 (a p-space read miss and a s-space read
miss): If the cache controller finds that there is a p-
space read miss, it doesn’t check the s-space because
s-space will not have the data either. It will retrieve the
new data from the main memory and place separate
copies of the data in both spaces.
• Scenario 3 (a p-space write hit and a s-space write
hit): If both the p-space and s-space find that they have
a write hit, both copies are updated.
• Scenario 4 (a p-space write miss and a s-space write
miss): If the cache controller finds that there is p-
space write miss, it doesn’t check the s-space because
s-space will not have the tag and data either. It will
retrieve the new data from the main memory and place
separate copies of the data in both spaces.
• Scenario 5 (a p-space write hit and a s-space write
miss): When the cache controller finds a write hit in
the p-space, it may still incur a s-space write miss. The
new write data will be deposited in both spaces.
• Scenario 6 (a p-space read hit and a s-space read
miss): When the cache controller finds a read hit in the
p-space, it may still have a s-space read miss. In this
case, the data is not protected by any shadow cache
lines. If the ECC module finds this data invalid, it will
repeat the same cache transaction again or trap to op-
erating system for further handling.
3 Shadow-Packet Partitioned Cache Shad-
owing (SP-PCS)
SP-PCS (Shadow-Packet PCS) is similar to PCS scheme
of the previous section and uses the same underlying
shadow caching principle. However, the shadow mecha-
nism deployed is different. In this case, we select one row
and one column of cache banks for s-space and do not pro-
vide any more shadowing inside a bank in way-set 2 to n-1
as in PCS. As highlighted in Fig. 3, our scheme uses one
of the nearest bank-sets (bank-set4) and the second nearest
way-set (way-set1) to the cache controller as the shadow
space (s-space) for fault tolerance. The reason for this is a
design issue with a bias towards balancing protection cover-
age with performance. Since shadow space access is a fairly
frequent operation, it is desirable to pull the shadow space
as close as possible to the cache controller to mitigate possi-
ble performance degradation. We also assume simple map-
ping, multi-cast search plus partial tag array search, one-
bank swapping, zero-copy and head replacement as in PCS.
Figure 3. Shadow-Packet PCS (highlighted
cache banks are designated as the shadow
space for data fault tolerance, and a shadow
packet will be sent along with the original
packet for communication fault tolerance)
In order to deal with possible deadlocks in the micronet-
works, we modeled contention by using wormhole-routed
flow control [2]. Exactly one packet can be queued at a
specific switch in a bank while another is being serviced.
Other banks along different network paths can still be ac-
cessed. Cycles are allowed due to the x-y and y-x routing
of the original and shadow packets. This issue can be ag-
gravated due to the combined use of the shadow cache with
shadow packets since more packets are contending the links
in the micro-network.
A bank in bank-set4 is used to store the MFU cache lines
of the cache banks in the corresponding way-set to which
it belongs. This is actually very similar to what we used
in PCS. The only difference is that in PCS, we distributed
the shadow ways to each of the cache banks, whereas in
SP-PCS, we aggregate these shadow ways in a contiguous
shadow space in bank-set4. Way-set1, however, is still used
as a shadow for way-set0, which contains most of the MFU
cache lines due to dynamic swapping. The rest of the L2
cache capacity is used to store primary data, which are pro-
tected by the shadow data in the shadow space. SP-PCS
stores data copies along with ECC in both p-space and s-
space. An additional goal here is to provide integrity check-
ing for communication micro-network. Consider the same
example of an 8x8 two dimensional mesh micro-network
based partitioned cache architecture as shown in Fig. 3.
Each cache bank is a k-way set associative write-back cache
where k=4 here. We use (x,y) pairs to indicate the location
of a specific cache bank. For example, banks (7, x), x vary-
ing from 0 to 7, are banks in bank-set7, where the number
’7’ is their common ’x’ coordinate. The original D-NUCA
scheme uses x-y routing by first sending packets along x co-
ordinate, and then perform a multi-cast search along the y
coordinate among the corresponding sets in different cache
banks. Suppose Bank (7, 5) is the desired destination of a
cache line to be accessed. To provide fault tolerance against
transient faults in the communication micro-network, our
scheme sends out a shadow packet (s-packet) along with
the original packet (o-packet) using a different route. It also
uses packets with CRC information attached to that. Also,
each packet will have a sequence number (seqno). Every
time an o-packet (data or control) is sent using x-y rout-
ing, a s-packet with the same seqno and payload is also sent
using y-x routing. Note that x and y axes in Fig. 3 are ro-
tated by 90 degrees to better accommodate the position of
the cache controller.
The operation of SP-PCS scheme involves six opera-
tional scenarios based on the micro-network communica-
tion pattern. As stated before, any cache line that is not in
the primary data space will not be present in the shadow
space. So we can have only six possibilities (listed as be-
low). The rest of the scenarios are not possible due to the in-
clusive nature of our shadow space within the primary data
space. Note that our experiments do take contention issues
into consideration. We will also use the same example of
Fig. 3 in the following discussion on various scenarios. The
destination bank is always bank (7,5) and the shadow bank
is always bank (4,5). The cache controller always sends out
two packets, o-packet via (x-y routing) and s-packet (via y-
x routing). The destination or shadow bank, on the other
hand, always sends back two packets as well as response
packets.
• Scenario 1 (a s-packet read hit followed by an o-packet
read hit): In this case once we have a s-packet read hit
at bank (4,5), we know that we will have a primary
cache hit later at bank (7,5) barring the loss of the o-
packet en route. After CRC verification, bank (4,5)
reads the data from s-packet and sends a reply packet
with the retrieved data as payload immediately. Later
on, the primary bank (Bank (7,5)) will also send its
reply packet for verification when the o-packet is re-
ceived by it. If the cache controller does not receive
packets on both occasions, it may retry. Upon failure
of a retry, it may declare a computation error.
• Scenario 2 (a s-packet read miss followed by an o-
packet read miss): In this case, only the primary bank
can initiate a read from main memory as a s-space miss
is also a likely scenario. After fetching the new data
from the main memory, both bank (4,5) and bank (7,5)
will have the copies of the new data installed. Both
banks can then send their response data packets back
to the cache controller using different routes.
• Scenario 3 (a s-packet write hit followed by an o-
packet write hit): If bank (4, 5) discovers that it is a
write hit the s-packet will update the cache line and set
the dirty bit in bank (4,5). The packet is also routed
to bank (7, 5). Either the o-packet or the s-packet will
update the cache line there.
• Scenario 4: (a s-packet write miss followed by an o-
packet write miss): When the s-packet reaches bank
(4,5) and finds a write miss, the shadow bank forwards
the packet to the primary bank. It also keeps a copy of
the packet in case the primary bank also finds a write
miss and the cache line is read from the main memory.
In that case the s-packet is used to update the line with
the new data. Upon finding a write miss in the primary
bank, the line is read and stored at both the primary
and shadow banks along with the data update and dirty
status.
• Scenario 5 (a s-packet write miss followed by an o-
packet write hit): Similar to the scenario 4, the shadow
bank forwards the s-packet to the primary bank while
retaining a copy for its possible future use. The pri-
mary bank will find a hit and will generate both o- and
s-packets as the response.
• Scenario 6 (a s-packet read miss followed by an o-
packet read hit): When the s-packet reaches bank (4,5)
it will find a read miss. The shadow bank assumes that
the primary has the data and does not resort to any ad-
ditional action. In this scenario, the o-packet will find a
read hit and there is a corresponding data copy in bank
(7,5). This is a case where the data is not protected.
4 Experimental Settings
We explored a large design space in both PCS and SP-
PCS, and evaluated both of them with a variety of para-
meters. We considered four transient fault models for cache
memories (direct, random, adjacent, and column) [6]. Since
there is little difference in the final results among the above
mentioned fault injection models, we present the results
only for the random fault injection model. Since we assume
that the PCS scheme executes the shadow cache accesses
totally in parallel with the main L2 cache and that the la-
tency of such activities are largely overlapped with the L2
cache access latency, we have mainly focused on the pro-
tection coverage measurements. We implemented both of
the schemes in sim-outorder, an out-of-order Alpha 21264
superscalar microprocessor simulator [1]. The default sim-
ulation values used in our experiments are given in Table
1.
We simulated the protection enhancement brought about
by transmitting and receiving shadow packets in a L2
cache within a wormhole-routed 2-D mesh micro-network.
We use applications from both the Spec2000 Integer suite
Table 1. Simulation Setup
Config. Parameters value
Functional Units 4 integer ALUs
4 integer ALUs
1 integer multiplier/divider
4 FP ALUs 1FP mul./div.
LSQ size 8 Instructions
RUU size 16 Instructions
Issue Width 4 instructions/cycle
L1 Inst/Data Cache 16KB, 2-way, 3 cycle lat.
Unified L2 Cache 4MB, 64 x 64 KB
L2 Cache Bank 4-way, 64B block, 6 cycle lat.
No. of L2 Cache Banks 64, 8 rows x 8 cols
Technology 50nm
(specINT) and the Spec 2000 Floating-point suite (specFP)
for evaluation. Note that the use of specINT and specFP
may be likely to slightly increase the fault coverage due to
their small footprint and regular access patterns. Neverthe-
less, we still elected to use these two benchmark suites due
to our intention to compare the results with other methods
in the literature. Different design parameters, such as the
number of cache banks in the micro-network, the associa-
tivity of each individual cache bank, etc. are investigated in
our experiments.
4.1 Evaluation Metrics
In order to notice the improvement in protection cover-
age, we use different metrics in the study to show the effec-
tiveness of the proposed schemes. Simulation results have
been obtained through the execution of 100 million instruc-
tions after skipping around 400 million initial instructions in
a variety of benchmarks in the Spec2K suite. Shadow Ca-
pacity Ratio (SCR) is the percentage of shadow space in the
whole cache space and a smaller SCR indicates better real
estate utilization. Loads with Shadow (LWS) is the fraction
of load hits that also find a shadow in the shadow space at
the time of the load. A higher fraction implies higher pro-
tection coverage. Successful Transfer Ratio (STR) is the per-
centage of successful transfer of at least one of the original
or shadow packets to the intended destination cache bank in
the underlying switched micro-network. This metric shows
the effectiveness of our SP-PCS scheme against transient
faults that can occur in the micro-network. Instructions
Per Cycle (IPC) is the number of instructions executed per




In PCS, we use one way-set (way-set1) and one way
in the rest of the banks in way-sets 2 to n-1 for shadow
caching. Assuming that each bank is k-way set associa-
tive, the shadow cache size in a n x n two dimensional mesh
is equal to the combination of one way-set (n cache banks)
and 1/k of the remaining n*(n-2) banks. Thus the ratio of
shadow cache to total cache is given by PCS shadow cache
capacity ratio SCRpcs = 1/n + (n − 2)/(n ∗ k). For ex-
ample for n=8, k=4, it is 31.25%.
For SP-PCS, the shadow cache capacity used is n +
n-2 (n-2 for remaining n-2 way-sets, except the first two
way-sets) banks. Thus the ratio of shadow cache to to-
tal cache is given by SP-PCS shadow cache capacity ratio
SCRsp−pcs = (2n − 2)/n ∗ n. For n=8, the ratio is almost
22%. It is smaller than that of PCS.
5.2 Protection Coverage
Benchmarks from both SPEC2kInt and SPEC2kFp are
simulated and protection coverage results are obtained for
PCS. As shown in Fig. 4, PCS achieves an average Loads
with Shadow (LWS) of around 96% in Spec2k, which
means the vast majority of the L2 loads are protected by
the PCS shadowing mechanism. For most of the Spec2K
benchmarks, the LWS of PCS is about 98% or 99%. Note
that for eon, mesa, vpr, equake and vortex, their LWSs
are very close, but not equal, to 100%. The art bench-
mark records the lowest loads with shadow (83%), whereas
equake etc. register almost full load coverage. This large
gap in protection coverage is in part due to each bench-
mark’s L2 access pattern. For example, the benchmark art
has a widely-spaced L2 access pattern after the filtering ef-
fect imposed by L1 cache, which can only be loosely fit into
the limited shadow space in PCS. So we notice a sharp drop
in protection coverage. On the other hand, equake has a
much more regular access pattern, which can be easily fit
into the shadow space. Since PCS is based on the dynamic
nature of the underlying partitioned architecture design, we
have also conducted experiments with different configura-
tions of the overall micro-network topology and the asso-
ciativity of each individual cache bank.
5.2.1 Protection Coverage for Different Configura-
tions of Micro-Network Topology
To measure the impact of different cache configurations of
the underlying partitioned architecture on the effectiveness
of our scheme, we considered the following two cases: Case























































Figure 4. PCS Protection Coverage (LWS) Re-



























Figure 5. Loads with Shadow (LWS) for Dif-
ferent Configurations of the Cache Micro-
Network
one shadow way for each bank, and one shadow way-set for
each micro-network configuration. Case 2: 8 rows x 8 cols
with 4-way set-associative cache bank, one shadow way for
each bank, and one shadow way-set for each micro-network
configuration. Increasing the number of cache banks in the
cache micro-network can make the dynamic nature of par-
titioning more pronounced. Although the relative capacity
allocated for shadow space (SCR) drops from around 37.5%
to 31.25%, the replication ability is affected very little by
the different configuration parameters (a drop of less than
2% in Loads with Shadow for most tested benchmarks), as
shown in Fig. 5. Some applications in the Spec2k Float-
ing Point Suite even experience an increase in loads with
shadow. Generally speaking, Spec2kFp is much more loop-
based and has a smaller and more regular working set than
Spec2Kint and thus can have a higher percentage of MFU































































Figure 6. Loads with Shadow for Different As-
sociativity of a Cache Bank
the cache controller. Since the primary data space that is
protected by the shadow space is location-wise fixed (way-
set1 and MFU cache lines in the rest of the cache banks),
it is not surprising that PCS demonstrates higher protection
coverage in Spec2kFp than in Spec2kInt.
5.2.2 Protection Coverage for Different Associativity
of a Cache Bank
We also conducted experiments on the following three cases
with different associativity in a cache bank. Since we main-
tain the size of the shadow space as fixed, the increase in
cache bank associativity can lead to relative decrease in
protection coverage. We considered three cases. Case 1:
8x8 with 2-way cache bank with one Shadow way in a set
and one shadow way-set. Case 2: 8x8 with 4-way cache
bank with one Shadow way in a set and one shadow way-
set. Case 3: 8x8 with 8-way cache bank with one Shadow
way in a set and one shadow way-set.
As shown in Fig. 6, although the relative capacity allo-
cated for shadow space is reduced from 50% in case 1 to
22% in case 3, increasing associativity of a cache bank does
not change much of our scheme’s protection coverage. A
relative small shadow space in L2 cache can thus be allo-
cated, which can promote overall system performance with
a bigger primary data space.
5.2.3 Protection Coverage for Different Number of
Shadow Ways
The impact of different number of shadow ways for in-
cache shadowing in the second level cache is further investi-
gated in Fig. 7. The purpose here is to show that one shadow
way in banks (other than those in way-set0 and way-set1) is
sufficient to provide good protection coverage. We consider












































Figure 7. Protection Coverage for Different
Number of Shadow Ways in a Cache Bank
n-1 for protection. The cache banks are 8-way set associa-
tive. Even though the shadow space capacity in L2 cache in-
creases, protection coverage does not improve significantly.
More specifically, one shadow way for each set in a cache
bank seems to be a better design choice since more cache
capacity can be used to enhance performance of the system.
5.3 SP-PCS Protection Results
We do not include protection coverage experimental re-
sults for this case for the sake of brevity because the basic
protection scheme for protecting way-set0 is identical and
the rest of the primary data space are protected in a similar
way in both PCS and SP-PCS. Our goal here is to study the
impact of communication micro-network transient faults in
this case. We considered random fault injection model.
In this model, an error is injected in a random link in the
switched micro-network at a random time. Transient faults
are deemed to have a probability of corrupting a packet dur-
ing each hop. Since we only intend to show the strengths of
our SP-PCS scheme under very heavy bombardments from
injected errors, we pick an error injection rate of 1/100000
for all of the tested benchmarks with an instruction size
of about 100 million instructions each. Note that transient
faults should be much rarer in a more realistic setting. Per-
centage of successful transfers is a measure of protection
coverage. Since each cache transaction sends out two pack-
ets, o-packet and s-packet, the scenario where at least one
of them arrives at the destination with an uncorrupted CRC
is considered a successful transfer.
As shown in Fig. 8, our SP-PCS scheme offers nearly
100% coverage for packet transmission and routing in the
switched micro-network for all of the tested benchmarks in
















































Figure 8. Percentage of Successful Transfer
for Communication Fault Tolerance
in the s-space, SP-PCS offers a complexity-effective alter-
native to guard against both data errors and network disrup-
tion.
5.4 Performance Results
As shown in Fig. 9, almost all of the listed benchmarks in
Spec2k suffered only slight performance degradation from
imposing our fault-tolerant substrate on the underlying D-
NUCA design. The IPCs of most of the benchmarks de-
creased by less than 3%, which is acceptable tradeoff with
much higher fault coverage under highly noisy environ-
ments. The biggest dent in IPC from using our substrate
comes from the benchmark mgrid (a little less than 10%),
where the benchmark’s performance is very sensitive to the
reduction in the size of the L2 primary space. The rea-
son for mgrid to experience a slight surge in performance
from using SP-PCS is that injecting shadow packets into
the underlying switched network may change the bank or
link contentions we’ve modeled in the 2-D mesh. Most
of the latencies from injecting shadow packets are over-
lapped by those from injecting original packets and some
shadow packets may prevent original packets from enter-
ing congested switches, thereby hiding some of the laten-
cies. Based on Fig. 9, it is shown that both using in-cache
shadowing for data protection and sending duplicate packet
for communication protection bring relatively little perfor-
mance overhead.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a novel partitioned cache shadow-
ing substrate in large on-chip caches. We use the existing
remote cache banks to hold replicas of a cache block while


























Figure 9. Normalized Change in IPC from PCS
the ”hottest” blocks will be migrated to the nearest cache
blocks, thus leaving other banks candidates for replication.
To guard against transient faults in the underlying micro-
network, we send out a duplicate packet along a different
route than the original packet. Our results show signifi-
cant improvements in protection coverage with little per-
formance degradation.
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